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Abstract
Since the formation of the European Project, the questions of which direction the EU
should take and what objectives it should pursue in the face of considerable ongoing challenges
have evolved over time. Today the Western Balkan states – the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM), Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Albania and Bosnia-Hercegovina – pose a
set of considerable challenges to the organization, and how the EU addresses the membership of
these countries will stand as a critical test of the organization’s competence. As the Union turns
its attention to membership consideration for these states, both their complexities and their
fragilities have created among EU member states grave doubts regarding the efficacy of
membership for all. The critical issues include internal ethnic hostilities, faltering economies,
the strain of refugee influx, regional political strains, and Soviet and Chinese economic and
political intervention. This thesis assesses both the benefits and costs of enlargement into the
Balkan region for both the countries seeking membership and the European Union. This thesis
argues that the Union should support enlargement only if it specifically serves the interests of the
organization. The Union should promote enlargement when it strengthens measurably deeper
integration policies. Successfully adding some or all of the Balkans states would significantly
enhance the EU’s international standing, broaden the reach of the organization, and
demonstrate the strength and sustainability of the its Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Lay Summary
The European Union is at a critical tipping point as it wrestles with the fallout of a series
of blows that have called into question the future of the Union. Faced with the rise of
Euroscepticism, the departure of one of its most prominent member states, and a number of
security threats, the EU must decide how it is going to move forward. Should it look to deepen its
political and economic ties in the region or should it seek to expand membership into
neighboring countries? By looking at the history of the European Union, this thesis will study the
benefits and challenges of European enlargement and its effects on European integration.
Additionally, this thesis will utilize the Western Balkan region as a case study to further analyze
the practical implications of expanding the European Union.
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I.

Introduction:
The concept of European integration has long been a part of the European project. Some

scholars view European integration as a necessary, almost inevitable, component of the Union’s
overall success as it helps to foster a sense of cooperation and interdependence among member
states. More specifically, both economic and political integration have worked together in an
effort to form the “ever closer union” that many officials have been striving to attain— though to
what extent integration should supersede national sovereignty remains a major point of
contention. As a whole, integration has tended to occur in waves, and has particularly accelerated
since the early 1980s.1
In recent years, however, scholars have raised questions regarding the long-term viability
of the European Union (EU). The EU, according to Bieber and Kmezić, has “moved into great
uncertainty, and this uncertainty threatens to unravel some of the pillars of stability on the
European continent that have been in place for decades”.2 Faced with the aftermath of the
Eurozone Crisis, the rising tension over how to handle the first departure of a major member
state, and the uncertainty of the refugee crisis, members worry about the organization’s
economic and political stability.
Two distinct schools of thought regarding integration contribute to the debate over how
to address these current issues. The first group of scholars call for deepening European
integration, which essentially means that the Union should focus solely on identifying and
solving the problems at hand without expanding integration outward. The second solution—

1

"Timeline of EU Integration". 2018. Civitas: Institute for the Study of Civil Society.
http://www.civitas.org.uk/eu-facts/eu-overview/timeline-of-eu-integration/.
2
Bieber, Florian, and Marko Kmezić. 2016. "EU Enlargement in The Western Balkans In a Time
of Uncertainty". http://www.biepag.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/EU-Enlargement-in-theWestern-Balkans-in-a-Time-of-Uncertainty.pdf.
3

which is the focus of this thesis— is to widen European integration by enlarging the EU’s
geopolitical stance and solidifying its strength through numbers. In the past, the policy of
widening integration has been the most commonly accepted and pursued in European politics.
Currently, however, policy-makers and scholars have shifted away from this policy. This has
occurred for two major reasons. The European Parliament’s briefing on the issues and challenges
of the Western Balkans’ relationship with the EU states clearly states this shift in policy:
“First, the EU itself is in a different situation. In 2014, the European Commission's newly
elected president announced a five-year halt to enlargement. In June 2016, the UK voted
to leave the EU, an event unprecedented in Union history. Second, the Western Balkan
countries present a case more complex than previous EU candidates, because apart from
making a difficult transition to democracy while struggling economically, they face the
legacy of relatively recent armed conflict and have bilateral disputes to resolve…”.3
Ultimately, the main goal of the EU is to become stronger, more resilient, and more
attractive to potential candidate countries. Therefore, while the EU has affirmed that the
integration of the Western Balkans remains a goal of both sides, this complex situation poses
serious challenges, and the prospect of future enlargement appears to be no more than a distant
dream. Consequently, in a time of crisis, the unanswered question remains: Should the EU
double down on its efforts to admit the Balkan states into the Union, or does this region pose too
much of a risk to the unity of the other 28 (soon to be 27) member states?

II.

Literature Review— a Historical and Theoretical Overview of European
Integration:
The EU today is “based on a series of treaties, pacts, and agreements between [sic]

member states, which have steadily increased the areas in which nation states in the EU are

3

Lilyanova, Velina. 2018. "The Western Balkans And The EU: Enlargement and Challenges Think Tank". European Parliament Think Tank.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2016)58979.
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integrated”.4 In essence, individual states have pooled their sovereignty in order to make certain
policy decisions at the European level, rather than at the level of each individual state. The
original quite monumental idea of creating a ‘united Europe’ has continued to expand in scope
and size since its inception— unifying a continent around a common goal in spite of its
fragmented history.
The story of European integration, as it is understood today, began in 1945. In the
Community of Europe: A History of Integration Since 1945, Derek W. Urwin charts the course of
European political and economic integration. He begins his analysis with the European ideal of
ending its history of regional political fragmentation by unifying the continent under a single
organization. Urwin reviews each of the major EU treaties and integration efforts conducted
through 2014. He concludes his book with an assessment of the mood and prospects of Europe
and the community today.
The Union initially sought to end the frequent and devastating wars between neighbors
that eventually culminated in the Second World War.5 In 1950, six countries – Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – formed the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC).6 In 1957 the six founding countries signed the Treaty of Rome, which
created the European Economic Community (EEC), or the European ‘Common Market’, and the
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom).7 The creation of the EEC marked the first step
in creating an integrated economic system. Between 1957 and 1986 six more countries joined the
organization. Consequently, the EU markedly enhanced its regional integration, which led to the
4

"Timeline of EU Integration". 2016. Civitas: Institute for the Study of Civil Society.
http://www.civitas.org.uk/eu-facts/eu-overview/timeline-of-eu-integration/.
5
"The History of The European Union - European Union - European Commission". 2018.
European Union. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history_en.
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
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signing of the 1986 Single European Act (SEA). The SEA “provided the basis for a vast
program aimed at sorting out the problems with the free flow of trade across EU borders” and in
turn created the ‘Single Market’.8 The 1990s produced two important treaties: the ‘Maastricht’
Treaty on European Union in 1993 and the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999.9 These treaties gave
rise to the European Union as it is known today and instated the Euro as the official currency of
the European Union. Other notable EU policies include the Schengen Agreement which
abolished the EU’s internal border checks, and the Treaty of Lisbon which provided the EU with
modern institutions and more efficient working methods. Ultimately, each wave of EU
integration has been both a response to the needs of the time and an effort to continue creating a
unified union within continental Europe.
In the Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-1995: A History of
European Integration, Martin Dedman accomplishes many of the same goals as other European
scholars. Through a historical analysis of Europe post-1945, Dedman crafts a concise
introduction on the history of European unity and integration. Additionally, Dedman looks at the
EU through a broader lens and assesses both the political and economic incentives for
establishing supranational organizations in the modern age. Dedman’s work, however, falls
short of a complete history and analysis of European integration as its timeframe ends in 1995.
Consequently, his work has become dated because it concludes before crucial transition period
following the Eastern enlargement boom of 2004 and the ensuing 2008 financial crisis.
In addition to the historical analyses of integration, a variety of theoretical perspectives
have helped to shape the academic opinions of EU scholars. These theories seek explanations of
how and why the European Union came about and how it progresses today. For example, neo8
9

Ibid., 5.
Ibid.
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functionalism offers the process of political spillover as an explanation of how the self-sustaining
policy of integration came about.10 Intergovernmentalism, on the other hand, emphasizes “the
role of the nation-state in integration and argues that the nation-state is not becoming obsolete
due to [sic] increased European integration”.11 This theory is particularly important to the future
prospects of enlargement because member-state involvement has slowly and continually changed
the motivation and criteria for the accession process. Civitas, an independent research
organization, compiled a list of the five most dominant theories of European integration—
neofunctionlism, intergovermentalism, liberal intergovernmentalism, (new) institutionalism, and
multi-level governance— and analyzed how they influence individual perspectives on current
integration efforts. More specifically, it charts when each of these theories was most prevalent in
European history and helps to explain why certain integration efforts have proven to be more
popular at certain times than at others.
Another crucial component of the history and theoretical nature of European integration
is the concept of European enlargement. According to Stefan Frölick, “enlargement is part of the
success story of the EU and has been a key driver of and a triggering factor for further
integration efforts”.12 Therefore, rather than simply looking at European integration and
European enlargement as two distinct EU policy platforms, he stresses the importance of
analyzing how the two ideas work together to further the goals of the European Union. In The
Future of Europe— Integration and Enlargement, Fraser Cameron argues that “the EU has
progressed since its creation through a mixture of both widening and deepening, in other words it
10

"Theories of European Integration". 2018. Civitas: Institute for The Study Of Civil Society.
http://www.civitas.org.uk/eu-facts/eu-overview/theories-of-european-integration/.
11
Ibid.
12
Brimmer, Esther, and Stefan Fröhlich. 2005. The Strategic Implications of European Union
Enlargement. Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, the Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.
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has taken steps towards closer integration at the same time as it has enlarged”.13 Since the 1950s
the European community has witnessed seven enlargements: in 1973 Britain, Ireland and
Demark joined; in 1981 Greece; in 1986 Spain and Portugal; in 1995 Austria, Sweden and
Finland joined; in 2004 Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Hungary joined; in 2007 Bulgaria and Romania; and in 2013 Croatia.14
Fraser argues that each round of enlargement has been accompanied by moves forward in the
process of integration.15 For example, the first enlargement was preceded by a common fisheries
policy and eventually led to the EU adopting a more cohesive regional policy. 16 The second and
third enlargements led to the signing of the Single European Act (SEA)— the first major treaty
reform since 1957. The SEA was significant because it laid the foundations for the completion of
the single market in 1992.17 These enlargements also led to a stronger social policy, an increased
commitment to solidarity with the poor regions of Europe, and increased powers for the
European Parliament.18 The fourth enlargement “followed moves towards economic and
monetary union and new policy areas in foreign policy and justice and home affairs”19. The fifth
enlargement occurred when the EU faced major challenges concerning its democratic legitimacy,
its internal cohesion and efficiency, its economic performance, and its external role. 20 However,
even in the face of these challenges, the EU was able to introduce its single currency (the Euro)
on the eve of its largest enlargement endeavor to date. From the moment the EU began to reunite
continental Europe and expand into the east, its institutional framework began to change. It has
13

Cameron, Fraser. 2004. The Future of Europe. London: Routledge.
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19
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caused growing pains, but the push for deeper integration continued without interruption. In
fact, in many cases, enlargement has actually been a driving force behind the EU’s integration
efforts.
Thus, as the Union’s current enlargement prospects grow, the inevitable eastward
expansion of the EU’s borders will continue to shape the Union’s very nature and chemistry. It
will further intensify the debates on the scope of the European Union, its future, the degree of
integration, and its geographical limits.21 It will call into question the nature of European
identity. But this debate is not new. The conversations have existed since the inception of the
European Union. The real issue with Eastern enlargement, according to Ulrike Guérot in his The
Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement, is the strategic impact of enlargement
on the “Old EU”.22 More specifically, the 2004 Eastern Enlargement, known as the “Big Bang”,
no doubt the biggest enlargement in European history, marked a historically unprecedented
achievement both in scope and in diversity and reunited Europe into a stronger, more democratic
continent.23 Consequently, it also created a watershed effect within the Union on future
enlargement prospects and ultimately opened ‘Pandora’s Box’.24
Prior to the accession of the ten new eastern member states, discussion about potential
new enlargement rounds had already begun. Indeed, only a few months after the “Big Bang”,
Turkey got green lights for the opening of accession talks in October 2005; the European
Parliament adopted a resolution requesting a membership perspective for Ukraine in January
21

Brimmer, Esther, and Stefan Fröhlich. 2005. The Strategic Implications of European Union
Enlargement. Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, the Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.
22
Ibid.
23
Cameron, Fraser. 2004. The Future of Europe. London: Routledge.
24
Brimmer, Esther, and Stefan Fröhlich. 2005. The Strategic Implications of European Union
Enlargement. Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic Relations, the Paul H. Nitze School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.
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2005; and other countries like Georgia did not miss a single opportunity to express their
perspective for membership.25 Thus, this new fast-tracked view on eastern expansion put into
question the very undertaking of European integration, especially the notion of further political
integration along the lines of ‘an ever closer union’.26 According to Guérot, many of the “Old
EU” member states who never had warm feelings about deeper European integration would now
hide behind the new difficulties and challenges to claim the project’s end. And, as time has
passed, clearly Guérot’s analysis has proven to be true.27 His chapter argues that Europe as a
whole is becoming a scapegoat for domestic frustrations. It is not a “young, dynamic, innovative
and rich European Union that is confronted with— cost-generating — enlargement, but an ‘old’
Europe that is over-aging and economically stagnant”.28 With the rise of nationalist tendencies
and right-wing movements, many voices in the old member states firmly believe that the end of
political integration has come and that the only way forward is to move away from progressive
new reform and revert back to a crisis-management model.
Still, while many scholars have argued that the Union has entered into a period of
“enlargement fatigue”, the continued prospects of greater international clout is enough to keep
the idea of European enlargement at the forefront of any major EU discussion. According to the
authors of The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement, the political implications
of creating a finite Europe present too many security risks to be a permanent solution.29 Various
scholars have analyzed how geopolitical factors affect enlargement and agree on the Union’s
prospects both on a regional and international scale. Moreover, while Europe continues to handle

25

Ibid., 9.
Ibid.
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Ibid.
28
Ibid.
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Ibid.
26
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its domestic problems, it continues to look for ways to expand its geopolitical stance in the
world. The various authors of The Strategic Implications of European Union Enlargement define
the EU as an organization that desires to be relevant in the international sphere both
economically and as a contributor to global security efforts. Two central schools of thought
contribute perspectives regarding the relationship between European enlargement and Europe’s
geopolitical standing in the world. One view— the Euro-optimist school— sees EU enlargement
as “an evolutionary step in the making of a prosperous Europe whole and free”. 30 For Eurooptimists, successive enlargements are logical extensions of the post-World War II European
project. They believe that as the EU expands its role as a critical global actor will grow stronger
and more relevant.
The second school of thought— the Euro-pessimist view – stresses the challenges
associated with EU enlargement.31 Most proponents of this school argue that reconciling
national interests of an ever-growing number of member states with that of the organization as a
whole will become increasingly difficult.32 Moreover, they argue that the difference between and
small and large member states and unequal economic development within the union will lead to
increasing friction and minimalist EU policies— thus decreasing the role of the EU as a global
actor.33
In A Larger EU: A More Effective Actor in the United Nations, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat
makes a case for an alternative third view— the Euro-pragmatic view. This perspective argues
that the “push for successive EU enlargement is unstoppable and at the core of the European

30

Ibid., 10.
Ibid.
32
Ibid.
33
Ibid.
31
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project”.34 This project seeks to promote liberal democracy, “not as a monopoly of West
Europeans but as [a] strongly to be preferred system to be defended against competing models in
the immediate neighborhood”.35 Thus, while enlargement inevitably complicates decisionmaking processes and raises collective-action problems, the challenge is not whether or not the
EU should abandon enlargement prospects, but rather how to make the best of an “inevitable,
inherently difficult, but potentially transformative situation”.36
Through an analysis of European integration from both a historical and a theoretical
perspective, a clear link exists between “deepening” integration efforts and “widening” the
Union through enlargement. The literature on this particular topic is expansive, and European
scholars have analyzed each of the past enlargements in relation to their effects on the European
Union as a whole. Significantly fewer scholars, however, have examined the future effects of
potential enlargement opportunities— particularly in regard to the Western Balkan region. While
many scholars have speculated regarding the future relationship between this region and the EU,
few have assessed the question of how enlargement into the Western Balkans could potentially
shape the organization’s push toward deeper social and political integration. This thesis will
begin to fill that scholarly gap by assessing the benefits and challenges of European integration
through enlargement by conducting a case study on the organization’s enlargement prospects
into the Western Balkans. More specifically, this thesis will critically assess the current
enlargement process and evaluate the Balkans both as a geographical region and as individual
states in terms of how they can aid Europe— economically, politically, and socially— in its most
recent push for a more integrated and “ever closer” union.

34
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III.

The Enlargement Process— Mapping the Way to European Accession:
The EU enlargement process is tedious and technical, and it involves so much more than

just territorial expansion of EU membership rights, privileges, and obligations to other European
states. According to Christophe Hillion, “enlargement also triggers new policy demands on the
Union, alters its institutional functioning, and affects its legal corpus”. 37 Thus, the process is
highly politicized and requires the organization to operate under “comprehensive approval
procedures that ensure new members are admitted only when they can demonstrate they will be
able to play their part fully”.38 Future member states must comply with all of the EU’s standards
and rules. Additionally, future member states must have the consent of the EU institutions and
other EU member states, and they must have the consent of their own citizens— gained through
expressed parliamentary approval or a state-wide referendum process.39 Still, a willingness to
abide by the rules and the expressed consent of all parties involved is not enough to grant a
country access to the European Union.
More specifically, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) sets out the conditions (Article
49) and principles (Article 6(1)) to which any country wishing to the become an EU member
must conform.40 In 1993 the Copenhagen European Council established these criteria, known as
the Copenhagen Criteria. Two years later the Madrid European Council furthered strengthened
these criteria.41 They include:

Hillion, Christophe. 2011. “EU Enlargement”. Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies.
"Conditions for Membership - European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations European Commission". 2018. European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations.
https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en.
39
Ibid.
40
"Accession Criteria (Copenhagen Criteria) - EUR-Lex". 2018. Eur-Lex.Europa.Eu. http://eurlex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague.html.
41
Ibid.
37
38
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1. stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights,
and respect for and protection of minorities;
2. a functioning market economy and the ability to cope with competitive pressure
and market forces within the EU;
3. the ability to take on the obligations of membership, including the capacity to
effectively implement the rules, standards, and policies that make up the body of
EU law (the ‘acquis’), and adherence to the aims of political, economic, and
monetary union.42
Most importantly, the EU needs to have the ability to absorb new members into the organization
without sacrificing the momentum of integration. Therefore, in the case of some countries, such
as the candidate countries of the Western Balkans, additional conditions for membership were
outlined in the “Stabilization and Association Process” (SAP). The SAP sets out “common
political and economic goals”, but progress evaluation is based on each country’s own merits.43
SAP put these conditions in place in order to facilitate regional cooperation and good neighborly
relations among the Western Balkan countries with the long-term intention of stabilizing the
region politically and establishing a free-trade area.
Once a country has been offered the prospect of membership and has satisfied the first
criterion, the country officially becomes a candidate country and accession negotiations can be
launched. Throughout the negotiation period, the conditions and timing of the candidate’s
adoption, implementation, and enforcement of all EU rules are established.44 These rules are then
divided into 35 different chapters— such as transport, energy, and education — and negotiated
separately. The European Commission keeps the EU Council and the European Parliament

42

Ibid., 13.
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informed throughout the process and monitors the candidate state’s progress in applying EU
legislation and fulfilling any benchmark requirements.45
The EU enlargement process, however, has evolved over time— influencing not only
how a country can join the EU, but also which countries are allowed to join. What was once
hailed as “the most successful EU foreign policy”, enlargement has been marked with
shortcomings that have weakened its credibility, effectiveness, and legitimacy.46 Motivated by
the past experiences of some candidate states’ “lack of preparedness for admission, mounting
doubts about the systemic sustainability of further expansion, and increased demands for
democratic accountability”, adjustments have been made in recent years.47 On the whole, these
changes have entailed the strengthening of member states’ control over the conduct of the policy.
While not always a bad thing, this newfound control has caused the enlargement process to be
dominated, and in some cases held hostage, by national agendas. Thus, instead of analyzing
potential candidate prospects from a purely objective set of criteria, the nationalization of
enlargement has introduced a whole host of legal and political hurdles to the accession process.
This new development has not only slowed down the accession process, but it has also raised
new questions as to the credibility of the EU commitments towards aspirant states, and
consequently the effectiveness of the enlargement policy’s “acclaimed transformative powers”.48
In addition, the EU has expanded the role of conditionality at all stages of the
enlargement process. More specifically, in an effort to mitigate concerns related to ill-prepared
candidate states and public disenchantment, both the Commission and the Council agreed to an
45
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“enlargement strategy based on consolidation, conditionality, and communication”.49 This
conditionality has manifested itself in a variety of ways, but one of the most notable
manifestations is the creation of a “benchmark” criteria. On the basis of a Commission
recommendation, the Council may define “benchmarks” that the candidate state has to meet in
order for the EU to open and/or close a particular negotiating chapter.50 According to the 2006
Commission document:
“Benchmarks are a new tool introduced as a result of lessons learnt from the fifth
enlargement. Their purpose is to improve the quality of the negotiations, by providing
incentives for the candidate countries to undertake necessary reforms at an early stage.
Benchmarks are measurable and linked to key elements of the acquis chapter.”51
Non-fulfillment of these pre-defined benchmarks may lead to the suspension of negotiations and
can stall the negotiations for an indefinite amount of time. The connection between
conditionality and negotiations is not entirely new to the enlargement process.52 In fact, the start
of the accession negotiations is almost always subject to the fulfillment of specific conditions—
many of which are now enshrined in the TEU. However, the introduction of specific benchmark
requirements significantly strengthens the overall use of more stringent conditionality in the
benchmark process and calls into question whether candidate states are making actual progress in
embedding EU norms into their societies, or if they are simply ticking off check boxes to
appease the other side. From the perspective of EU member states, this process works as an
emergency brake for potential enlargement growing pains. It gives them more control over who
gains access to the Union, and it affords dissenting states the opportunity to stop negotiations
until the organization meets their concerns. However, this control has led to unpredictability in

49
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the process and an abuse of power by many current member states. In some cases, member states
using their relative power have high-jacked the enlargement process in order to settle a bilateral
dispute.53 For example, in the case of Greece and (the former Yugoslav Republic of) Macedonia,
Greece prevented the opening of accession negotiations, despite the favorable recognition of the
Commission. Ultimately, evidence from research supports neither the current benchmark
approach to conditionality nor the nationalization of the enlargement process as effective
mechanisms for encouraging and measuring real and sustainable change in candidate countries.54
Regardless of the effectiveness of the evolving enlargement process, however, these are the
parameters that the Western Balkan countries— and any future candidate country— will have to
contend with as they seek access to the European Union.
IV.

The EU & the Western Balkans— From Yugoslavia to EU Candidate States:
The Balkans have been the major testing ground of the European Union’s developing

international role and in particular its common foreign and security policy (CFSP).55 Though the
Western Balkans have long been plagued with regional conflict and strong ethnic divisions, the
violence that ensued between 1991-1999 in the Balkan peninsula created the largest death toll
and the worst refugee crisis that Europe has seen since World War II. While Europeans viewed
this conflict as a test of their ability to resolve security crises, they lacked the cohesion,
determination, and instruments to bring the crisis under control.56 Thus, as the bloodshed
worsened, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the US, intervened and
resolved the conflict. In 1995 the United States bombed Serbia into acceptance of a peace deal

53
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signed in Dayton, Ohio.57 Four years later the EU again failed to play a determining role in the
Kosovo conflict.58 Although the EU’s overall cohesion had improved, the EU lacked the military
capabilities to end the conflict and was forced to watch as NATO, once again headed by the US,
took control of the situation. By all accounts, the EU’s reaction to the Yugoslav wars
embarrassed its leaders; however, following the end of the conflict, the EU’s Balkan policy
“became more coherent and proactive and the US-European relationship in the Balkans shifted
towards greater equality”.59 In 2000 the European Union crafted a comprehensive new policy
approach for the Balkan region known as the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP).
Simply put, this process not only continued to deploy the EU’s foreign policy and crisis
management strategies in order to promote the stabilization of the region, but it held out the
promise of future association and membership opportunities for the Balkan states.60
In June 2003, in Thessalonica, the EU reemphasized its commitment of association by
bringing together all of the respective parties at the EU-Western Balkans Summit. With this
meeting, the EU declared that the future of the Balkans would be in the EU, and stated that the
region’s future candidates for membership must affirm fully their commitment to the goals of the
EU by advancing down the road to reform. The purpose of the ‘enriched’ EU partnership with
these countries was to “establish clear benchmarks to assess progress and lay the basis for a
policy of conditionality in relation to increased financial assistance and the prospect of accession
negotiations”.61 It also linked the step-by-step implementation of the SAP to the EU’s influence
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in the region— affording the organization the opportunity to reduce the likelihood of conflicts
and shaping the Balkan peninsula into future members of Europe.
Since the EU asserted this new commitment to the Western Balkans, however, it has
faced a variety of institutional challenges, including the 2008 financial crisis, the looming
departure of Britain from the EU, the rise of nationalist parties in EU member states, and the
ongoing refugee crisis. This tipping point has forced EU officials to reevaluate their future goals.
In 2014 European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker announced a five-year halt on
enlargement. This distancing of the membership prospects in favor of enhanced regional and
economic integration efforts forced German Chancellor Angela Merkel to create the 'Berlin
process' in an attempt to salvage the EU’s relationship with the Balkan region and keep the hope
of membership alive. Consisting of yearly high-level meetings between the six Western Balkan
governments and several EU member states between 2014 and 2018, this process aims to
reaffirm the region's EU perspective by improving cooperation and economic stability within it.62
Currently, Merkel’s “Berlin Process” appears to be working, but many observers contend
that time is running out for the EU to make a tangible move in the Balkans. Overcoming a
decade of “enlargement fatigue” the latest plan unveils the Union’s new strategy for the region
and projects that it might be able to offer some states membership by 2025. The frontrunners to
join are Montenegro and Serbia, with Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia lagging. All Western Balkan states have expressed impatience
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and annoyance at the EU’s putting expansion on hold.63 Moreover, EU officials broadly disagree
over the executive’s push to expand into the Western Balkans. Bulgarian Prime Minister Boyko
Borisov, for example, recently warned that it was “now or never for expanding the EU into the
Balkans” as concerns grow about Moscow’s influence in the bloc’s eastern backyard.64
Hungary’s Peter Szijjarto was “very much disappointed” by that 2025 target, arguing that the
first two countries from the Western Balkan six should be admitted by 2022.65 Both of these
officials stressed that EU entry would help relieve tensions between neighbors in a region that
sits on the bloc’s doorstep.66 To make matters more difficult for the Western Balkans states,
Germany, the EU’s leading power, has expressed reluctance to commit to any timeline on
account of rule-of-law shortcomings in some of the current newer member states of the
organization. Sharing the same hesitant opinions of France and Slovenia, Germany holds that
much works needs to be done before the Western Balkans can be seriously considered for
membership.
Overall, the EU currently has a stronger profile in the Balkans than ever before. Years of
the SAP process and financial contributions have produced significant progress to validate the
overall policy approach. Opening the perspective of EU membership to the region has had some
important successes— including increased economic growth and overall stabilization. All of
these countries, however, continue to face significant structural challenges. The stability of the
region remains intrinsically linked to the European Union, and the organization’s credibility as
an international actor depends on its success in the Balkans. Therefore, it is critical that the EU
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continues to look for ways to fulfill its commitment to the Balkans in a timely fashion without
compromising its membership standard or the effectiveness of reforms.

V.

A Closer Look— an Individual Analysis of Each Prospective Balkan State:
The Western Balkan states present the EU with a unique situation. Given the region’s

long history of conflict, the EU has designed policies that foster a sense of regional cooperation.
Hence when the EU implements strategies in the Balkans it tends to do so in a sweeping manner
and under the pretense of uniting the region with a common goal. Still, while Europeans tend to
discuss the Western Balkan states as a collective unit, it designs policies and responses to each
individual Balkan state on its own merits. Unlike the 2004 enlargement, the EU will likely avoid
a situation in which it would admit all six remaining Balkan countries at one time. Indeed, the
European Union is not looking toward a “Balkan Boom” in which a single enlargement would be
dramatic and sweeping. Each Balkan country is reforming at a different pace, and each one will
join the EU only when it has met all of the necessary criteria. Thus, to understand the
implications of Western Balkan enlargement for the European Union, it is essential to analyze
each prospective country individually, as each one brings its own benefits and challenges to
future EU integration efforts.
Montenegro
Made up of a population of only 633,000, Montenegro is largely considered the front
runner in the EU accession race.67 Despite not emerging as a sovereign state until 2006,
Montenegro applied for full membership to the EU in 2008 and was confirmed as a candidate
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country in 2010— although official negotiation talks did not begin until June 29th, 2012.68 While
Montenegro still has a long way to go before its negotiations with the EU are complete, the
country is recognized with making significant strides to acquiesce the demands of the European
Union. With 30 chapters open and widespread support among EU officials, the Montenegrin
Foreign Minister expects that the country could join any time between 2022-2025. In fact, in its
2016 assessment of the accession process, the European Commission has identified Montenegro
as having the highest level of preparation among the candidate states.69 However, in order to gain
admission, the EU says that Montenegro must, “intensify its efforts to consolidate the rule of
law, fight organized crime and corruption, and protect freedom of expression”.70
The accession of Montenegro would have little overall impact on the EU— which is why,
out of the remaining Balkan states, it is forecasted to gain access to the EU first. Not only does
the country already use the Euro, but its small population size would mean that the country
would have minimal institutional influence particularly in the European Parliament. The addition
of Montenegro’s economy would have a positive, albeit minor, effect on the EU’s overall GDP,
and in comparison with the remaining Balkan states it has few bilateral disputes that would lead
to future tensions in the region. Additionally, the Montenegrin people are largely Euro-positive,
and are very excited about the prospects of their country joining the EU. According to a recent
public opinion poll, more than three-quarters of Montenegro's citizens (76.5 percent) would turn
out to vote in a referendum on joining the European Union.71 Of the total number of decided
citizens who would vote – those who at the time of the poll had a clear position on this issue –
68
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80.9 percent would vote YES, while only a quarter of that number (19.1 percent) would opt for
NO.72 This is particularly relevant because at a time when the EU is faced with the rise of
Euroscepticism and the departure of one of its largest member states, it is increasingly important
to offer membership to states that want to be a part of the EU.
Serbia
Following Montenegro, Serbia is predicted to be the next Western Balkan country to join
the EU. However, Serbia’s progress has been sluggish and greatly hindered by its stance on
Kosovo. While Serbia applied for membership in 2009, the EU granted it candidate status until
2012. Negotiations commenced two years later. Incentivized by its desire for membership, the
Serbian government has made strides in its tense relationship with Kosovo. Although it still
refuses to recognize the sovereignty of Kosovo, the country did reach a landmark deal that
allowed for the normalization of ties. Additionally, Serbia continues to cooperate with the
international war crimes tribunal in The Hague. Serbia will unlikely gain admission to the EU
prior to 2020— in fact the current trajectory date is 2025— but the Serbian government has
carried out a number of reforms that have moved it closer to meeting the requirements of the EU.
Serbia is a uniquely important candidate country. Although its economic contribution will
have minimal impact on the overall GDP of the EU, its population size makes it one of the
largest prospective Balkan countries. Thus, its institutional impact will be greater than that of
Montenegro. In addition, its fragmented past— namely the independence movements in
Montenegro and Kosovo— ensures that rivalry will continue to characterize the Balkan states.
While this might appear to be a problem, Serbia’s commitment to EU membership demonstrates
that it is willing to compromise on certain issues. Moreover, Serbia has always had a unique
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historic tie to Russia. To this day, the country still views Russia in a positive light, and Russia
uses this channel to their advantage. However, if Serbia willingly chooses to pursue the EU its
membership will greatly disrupt the Russian attempt to regain a sphere of influence in the Balkan
peninsula.
Albania
Albania submitted its application for EU membership in 2009 and gained official
candidate status in 2014. Negotiation on formal accession has not yet begun, and though
Albanian officials are hopeful that they will start up soon, the EU has set no official timeline. In
the words of Albanian Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs, “we know very well that it will
take time, and we want to use this time to further transform our country in every sense and to
bring citizens close to Europe”.73 In 2016 Albania sat at a crucial crossroads. Forced to choose
between its historical legacy of corruption and the EU, the Albanian government implemented
sweeping judicial legislation that has been called the one of the most important ongoing reforms
in any of the enlargement countries. The next step will be to wait for the Commission to
recommend the beginning of accession talks, but until then the EU Commissioner for
Enlargement noted that Albania has to continue to “deliver the reforms in five key areas,
identified as public administration, corruption, rule of law, organized crime and fundamental
rights”.74 Albania has a long road ahead before it gains admission to the EU, and its track record
is not helping. However, the EU’s willingness to keep the door to enlargement open and to
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continue pushing the Albanian government to crack down on corruption and implement reforms
has proven to be a positive outcome of the process.
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) applied for EU membership in
March 2004. The Commission issued a favorable opinion in November 2005, and in 2005 the
Council agreed to grant the country candidate status. In spite of the ongoing need for reform, the
European Commission reported that FYROM had made significant progress in “police reform,
tackling corruption, and bolstering human rights”.75 The Macedonians had hoped that
negotiations for EU accession would commence in 2008, but election violence and a subsequent
boycott of parliament by ethnic Albanian opposition parties derailed this plan.76 In October 2009,
the Commission finally recommended that accession negotiations be opened, but since this
recommendation no chapters have opened or closed.
The biggest barrier to FYROM membership in the EU is its disputes with the EU member
states of Greece and Macedonia. In the case of Greece, the two countries disagree over
Macedonia’s name. While the United Nations admitted Macedonia in 1993 using the temporary
name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece holds that the name “Macedonia”
cannot be monopolized by one country. The Greek government argues that using the name
“Macedonia” implies a territorial claim over the northern Greek region of the same name. In a
2008 interview, however, Macedonian Foreign Minister Antonio Milososki said, "it is important
that 125 countries worldwide have recognized Macedonia's constitutional name," and added: "we
remain firm on our stance that only the Republic of Greece has a problem with Macedonia's
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constitutional name".77 To complicate matters, the country of Bulgaria refuses to recognize
“Macedonians” as a distinct ethnic group and therefore continues to block FYROM’s attempts to
join the European Union. Simply put, these deeply rooted political issues present few solutions,
particularly given the unwillingness to compromise on the part of the states party to the disputes.
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia is making great strides to conform to the
requirements of the EU, and the EU wants this country to join. Thus, it is imperative that the EU
encourage membership as a means to mediate some of these disputes. Though there is no target
date for FYROM accession, both the EU and Macedonia could benefit greatly from the accession
of Macedonia to the European Union.
Bosnia-Hercegovina (BiH)
Bosnia-Hercegovina remains one of the most troublesome Balkan states. Divided into
two autonomous regions— the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bosniak-Croat) and the
Republika Srpska— the country is still plagued with ethnic tension and systematic corruption.
Little progress has been made to meet the accession requirements of the European Union and it
remains one of the poorest countries in the region. Moreover, while BiH was recognized as a
potential candidate country in 2003, it did not apply for EU membership until 2016. The
European Commission holds that Bosnia is “an unstable political climate” and the European
Court of Humans Rights ruled that Bosnia’s judicial system is plagued with discriminatory
policies that must be reformed.78 Ultimately, the domestic politics of BiH are the greatest barriers
to EU membership, and without serious reform and commitment the Bosnian government will
not be able to petition the EU to move forward on negotiations.
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Although the accession of Bosnia-Hercegovina into the EU is not going to happen for
quite a while, EU member states are concerned about the ongoing ethnic tensions and the
increased levels of inter-European migrations that the West could see from Bosnia. Still, it is
critical that the EU keep trying to influence the transformation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Ravaged
by the years of mass violence in the Yugoslav Wars, BiH has been left war-torn and divided.
Given the long road to recovery, the EU could play a critical role in helping to reshape the
economic and political relationships across the region. Moreover, as Serbia gets closer and
closer to EU membership, Russia is looking for another Balkan state from which to assert its
influence. Recently Milorad Dodik, the Bosnian Serb leader, called for the break-up of BosniaHercegovina. The separatist praised the friendly, financial support of Russia and China without
political attachments— unlike the EU— and argued that a break from the West is in the best
interest of Bosnia.79 While Dodik’s rhetoric has gained little widespread support, the EU must
aggressively implement a strategy of integration that assert’s the organization’s positive
influence across the Balkan peninsula, particularly in BiH. Bosnia has a lot to gain from EU
membership and, in spite of the recent setbacks, it must not give up on the country.
Kosovo
The Balkans breakaway territory of Kosovo is the last in the queue to join the EU
because the international community remains split over its 2008 declaration of independence.80
While many countries have recognized the sovereignty of Kosovo, the countries of Serbia,
Russia, and China— along with 5 EU member states (Spain, Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and
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Cyprus)— have refused recognition. For more than a decade, the hostility between Belgrade and
the Kosovan authorities in Pristina have held up consideration of a Kosovan EU bid.81 However,
a 2013 deal brokered by the EU initiated the first steps in thawing the relationship between
Serbia and Kosovo. In this deal, both sides pledged that they would not try to block the other’s
EU bid. Still, the Serbian government refuses to acknowledge the sovereignty of Kosovo.
Overall, the Commission has praised Pristina's co-operation with the EU law-and-order mission
in Kosovo, called Eulex, but it has also called for further efforts to tackle human trafficking in
Kosovo and the smuggling of drugs and illegal weapons by gangs. 82 In addition, protection of
minority rights and freedom of speech are also significant challenges that Kosovo must address
in order to gain consideration for EU membership. The Kosovan leadership has made significant
strides in implementing reforms into the political, economic, and legal systems of Kosovo, but its
membership is still contingent on a resolution with Serbia regarding its independence.
Kosovo is perhaps the keenest of the Balkan states to join the EU. A small, landlocked
country with few natural resources and a newly acquired independence, the country has
explicitly stated that it wishes to become a fully integrated member of the European Union. Its
population has remained broadly supportive of EU membership. Nevertheless, Kosovo faces
many challenges, including border issues, charges of war crimes, and a sovereignty dispute with
Serbia. Kosovo will need to satisfy each of these demands before the process can really move
forward. Unfortunately, Kosovo sits at the crux of many key issues for two of the Balkan
frontrunners for EU membership— Serbia and Montenegro. Thus, its membership prospects are
plagued with politics and special conditions. Despite the fact that Kosovo is the most excited of
the Balkan Six about EU membership, it is likely that it will end up being the last to join.
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Unresolved bilateral disputes have been persistent hurdles for all of the Western Balkan
governments on their path toward EU accession, and each dispute poses a risk of renewed
instability and further delays domestic reforms. The Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group
(BiEPAG) organizes the region’s bilateral disputes into three categories: border disputes,
political disputes, and minority-rights disputes.83 While border disputes in the region primarily
concern the demarcation of borders after the break-up of Yugoslavia, political disputes and
minority-rights disputes concern national identity and are thus highly sensitive issues that need to
be handled accordingly. The most prominent examples of political disputes are those involving
Kosovo and Serbia as well as the longstanding name dispute between FYR Macedonia and
Greece.84 Still, the general consensus among the Western Balkan states is that these bilateral
issues pose little risk to regional stability but continue to derail the Balkan accession process and
democratic transformation. Therefore, in the spirit of good neighborliness and shared
commitment to EU integration, the governments of the Western Balkan states agreed to “not
block, or encourage others to block” the progress of neighbors on their respective EU paths.85 In
spite of this agreement, quite a few bilateral disputes remain that have yet to be resolved, and the
EU has stuck by its declaration that the Union would not import these problems into its
organization. However, the commitment to regional cooperation by the Balkans remains a step in
the right direction and serves as further encouragement that with some help from the EU, the
future of the Western Balkans in Europe looks promising.
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VI.

A Case for Continued European Enlargement— What the Balkans Can Contribute
to Europe:
The current debate for European enlargement comes at a critical time for the Union. As

stated previously, the EU is at a tipping point. While many promote extensive and rapid
enlargement as a means for strengthening and legitimizing the organization at a time when many
question its long-term viability, others argue for more cautious. They contend that a focus on
greater ties and not on broader membership is a more prudent approach. Both EU officials and
EU citizens are concerned about the future direction their organization will take. Is now the
appropriate time for another enlargement? For the past decade, the EU has endured what some
scholars have labeled “enlargement fatigue”. Negotiations in many areas have stalled, prospects
have dimmed, and the once enthusiastic future members were told that it was unlikely they
would gain access to the EU anytime soon. However, as Europe sits at the crossroads of its
future, there is a clear argument for enlargement, particularly cautious interest-driven
enlargement into the Western Balkans, that should be made. More specifically, enlargement into
this region is ultimately in the best interests of the EU for three key reasons.

First, it

demonstrates the strength of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy through successful
state-building and regional security efforts. Second, it introduces valuable partner states in the
ongoing refugee crisis. Finally, it secures Europe’s geopolitical stance in the face of encroaching
Russian/Chinese political influence in the region.
Point #1— Enlargement into the Western Balkans demonstrates the strength of the EU’s
Common Foreign and Security Policy.
Widely recognized as an international actor, the EU has played a crucial role in defining
the future path for the Balkans. However, the EU does not simply want to be a global actor, it
wants to be a global leader. To do this, the EU needs to not only assert dominance in its region,
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but it also needs to demonstrate the strength of its foreign policy. The Western Balkans are
located in a prime spot to demonstrate this strength. Since its inception, the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC), the precursor to the European Union, sought to prevent European
wars through economic interdependency and multilateral cooperation. The inability for cohesive
military action in the once ethnically fragmented and war-torn Balkan peninsula was a source of
great embarrassment for the EU in the early 1990s. However, since the EU has committed itself
to the Western Balkans, it has witnessed a serious and focused commitment to cooperation
within the region. The threat of future conflict is minimal, and for the most part each of the
remaining Balkan Six are working together under the common goal of joining the EU. If and
when the EU fulfills its promise of enlargement into the Western Balkans it will have not only
united another key area of Europe, but also succeeded in stabilizing the region. Moreover, this
endeavor will demonstrate to the world that the European Union has the capacity and the will to
create and carry out a cohesive foreign-policy plan.
Point #2— Enlargement into the Western Balkans introduces valuable partner states in the
ongoing refugee crisis.
The ongoing refugee crisis remains one of Europe’s most significant unresolved
problems. The sudden influx of migrants has left EU leaders scrambling for solutions and has
resulted in the closure of numerous internal borders. The Western Balkans are crucial actors in
this situation. During the peak of the European migration and refugee crisis, hundreds of
thousands of asylum seekers and migrants arrived in the European Union via the Western
Balkans.86 Key components of crisis management fell to non-EU states along the “Balkan
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Route”, primarily Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which consequently
were not consulted on broader, European-wide responses.87 While the Balkan countries first
opted to facilitate the safe movement of refugees through their territories to the north to pass on
the responsibility, the pressure from EU member states ultimately resulted in a series of border
controls and increasing restrictions on the flow of movement. This led to a sudden drop of
immigrants entering Europe from the “Balkan Route”, and migrants still wishing to travel north
were pushed into more dangerous and irregular channels. Additionally, thousands of migrants
were left stranded in under-resourced camps and reception centers along the borders, primarily in
Serbia and Bulgaria.88 Though this practice has little effect on the European Union, for countries
still consolidating democratically and developing the rule of law, it has devastating implications.
More specifically, the movement of hundreds of thousands of people has renewed dormant
tensions between and within individual Balkan countries, while exacerbating strains between the
Balkans as a region and the European Union.89
By enlarging into the Western Balkans, the EU faces an unparalleled opportunity to
partner with the Balkan countries to implement a cohesive strategy and secure the “Balkan
Route”. This policy would not only ensure that the Balkan states did not suffer setbacks from the
pressure of increased migration, but it would also mitigate a humanitarian crisis by finding safer
and more controlled passageways for refugee and migrant travelers. Rather than sending
financial aid and expecting the newly developed Western Balkan states to handle the issue on
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their own, enlargement creates an important partnership that equally shares the problem and the
burden of finding a feasible solution.
Point #3— Enlargement into the Western Balkans secures Europe’s geopolitical stance in
the face of encroaching Russian/Asian political influence in the region.
The Western Balkans occupy a special place in Russian foreign policy. For years Russia
has continuously worked to exert influence in Southeast Europe, utilizing Serbia to “establish a
friendly pocket on a hostile continent”.90 In addition to its cultural and historical ties with local
Orthodox Slavs, the Russian leadership is still haunted by the Kosovo crisis and the NATO
bombing campaign of Serbia. Currently, Russia is trying to align itself more closely with the
region in order to diminish the growing influence of the European Union. Serbia, Montenegro
and the Serbian part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republika Srpska, traditionally have ties with
Russia. Over the years, natural gas supplies, infrastructure projects and Russian investments have
reinforced these links91. While Europe remains the largest financial contributor in the Western
Balkans, the subtle push by Russia to utilize a soft-power strategy to regain a sphere of influence
in the region is a cause for concern. There is no answer to the deepening-widening matrix of the
EU, but the EU “can only become a global player if it actively takes part in shaping the European
neighborhood, and builds a geo-strategic dimension by giving the border countries a perspective
for membership”.92
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Ironically enough it was the Russians and their policies in the Balkans that triggered the
alarm bells that spurred the European Union into action.93 While negotiations had at one point
significantly slowed, the EU has recently pushed the Western Balkans to the top of their agenda
and implemented a new campaign to incentivize the Balkan region. However, the European
Union will not be able to reduce Russia’s influence in the region until all of the Western Balkan
states are full members of the EU. Thus, it is critical that the Union continue its push for future
enlargement into the Balkans to cement their geopolitical influence in the region and reclaim the
Balkan peninsula as a vital part of Europe. As President of the European Commission, JeanClaude Juncker, stated, “investing in the stability and prosperity of the Western Balkans means
investing in the security and future of our Union”.94 Simply put, it is imperative that the Western
Balkans do not become so disillusioned with the West and its inability to match exaggerated
expectations that many of them are willing to be attracted or lured by any alternative. 95 The
future of the Western Balkans is with Europe, and the EU needs to ensure that this promise
becomes a reality.
Furthermore, undoubtedly the EU is committed to the idea of enlargement into the
Western Balkans. In fact, just recently the European Commission released the ‘the six flagship
initiatives’ to support the transformation of the Western Balkan region.96 However, the changed
approach towards enlargement in the Western Balkans has resulted in varied perceptions of the
EU’s actions. More specifically, the addition of further political conditions and the emphasis on
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the journey rather than the outcome of accession has affected the credibility and consistency of
the strategy.97
Ultimately, these perceptions are crucial to the overall enlargement prospects because “a
credible perspective of EU membership creates a powerful incentive for fundamental reform of
these societies”.98 Thus, while it is important to note that the ultimate responsibility lies with the
countries of the Balkans themselves and their will to introduce the necessary reforms, it is in the
interest of the EU to facilitate good relations and ensure that their promises of accession are
perceived as credible. Agreed objectives, common criteria, individual merits, and accession
target dates are possible only once it is clear that progress has been achieved— but progress is
more likely to occur when clear rewards and incentives are made available along the way. The
Western Balkans are motivated to action by the prospect of one day becoming official members
of the European Union, but this enthusiasm will only last for as long as their goal remains in
sight. While there is no time limit on the accession process, the longer these countries go without
seeing any reward for their efforts, the less political motivation they will have to keep making
changes.
VII.

A Case for Continued European Enlargement— How Europe Must Frame the
Process:

While it is crucial to analyze what the Balkans can contribute to the European Project, it is
also important to understand the factors that Europe should prioritize when shaping their final
decision: the growing influence of China in Eastern Europe, the role of public opinion in the
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European Union, and the potential negative impact further enlargement might have on the EU’s
ability to implement a cohesive foreign policy strategy.
First, the European Union must not underestimate the increasing role of China when they
make their final decision. Although Europe appears to be more concerned by Russia’s historical
influence in the Balkan region, the evolution of Sino-European relations is something that
Europe must take note of. In many ways, this developing new relationship has the potential to
become one of the most dynamic international relationships of the 21st century, but it is not
without its flaws. More specifically, China’s recent push to involve itself in Europe’s regional
politics through their “One Belt, One Road” initiative— offering money to rebuild roads and
infrastructure in some of Europe’s poorest countries— has received caustic reviews from EU
officials. At a time when the EU is facing an uphill battle between nationalist movements,
growing Euroscepticism, and an east-west divide, the last thing the Union needs is a third-party
actor coming in an exploiting these problems. Though China argues that this has never been the
country’s goal, many in the EU are skeptical— especially with China’s recent interest in Eastern
Europe. One such example of this is China’s 16+1, “a grouping of 16 central and eastern
European countries led by China”.99 While countries like Hungary, Serbia, and Poland are
hailing the approach as a “tremendous opportunity” and an “Eastward Opening”, EU officials are
concerned that it could lead to an exploitation of Europe by Beijing. 100 Thus, the European
Union must carefully assess the risks of allowing China to continue influencing the Balkans
states financially and politically as it moves forward in the accession process.
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Next, the EU must find a way to balance the desires of the organization with the views of the
public. Since its creation, the European Union has been criticized for its lack of democratic
legitimacy. Its formal decision-making process is insulated from the ebbs and flows of popular
opinion, but that does not mean that it shouldn’t be aware of the overall public opinion of
member states, particularly in regard to the enlargement process. As enlargement and integration
efforts become more heavily dominated by the individual agendas of EU member states, the role
of public opinion becomes crucial in implementing successful policies. If the Union does not
find ways to mitigate rising fears and Euroscepticism around Europe, then it will not be able to
fully integrate the Balkan states into the European Union. There is no general consensus in the
EU about whether or not the EU should continue its enlargement push into the Balkan states;
however, EU officials must be aware of the growing divide between the top and bottom of its
organization or face the consequences of future fragmentation.
Finally, the European Union must acknowledge the overall risks of enlarging into the various
Balkan states. More specifically, while enlarging into the Balkans might immediately enhance
Europe’s global standing as a world player, the sudden increase in member states might hurt the
organizations ability to enact cohesive foreign policy strategies in the future. Sometimes, bigger
isn’t always better. More members inherently means more voices, more national interests, and
more opinions to consider. The Union of 28 is already a slow-moving organization when it
comes to wide-sweeping decisions, and adding six new members— each with their own
problems and rivalries— might do little to help the overall foreign impact of the EU in the future.
Thus, it is important that the European Union ease into this transition with careful consideration
to ensure that the new Balkan member states have the ability to fully integrate into the Union
without weighing it down.
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Enlargement into the Balkans presents the European Union with a very delicate situation that
must be handled with a keen sense of diplomacy and statesmanship. If the EU is successful, this
particular enlargement has the power to reshape Europe’s standing in the world. It would
demonstrate the evolution of the Union’s commitment to a cohesive and effective foreign policy
as well as its ability to resolve regional tensions and contribute to the state-building process of
post-conflict states. However, if the European Union fails, it will be another blow to the Union’s
already fracturing influence. The European Union promised the Balkans that their future was
with Europe without fully considering the lasting implications of this promise, and now, in spite
of the problems enlargement into this region presents, the EU must find a way resolve the Balkan
question to both maintain its credibility and maintain its own sense of regional security.

VIII.

Conclusion:
As a whole, enlargement is both a driver of integration and an integral part of the

European Union’s security policy. Though the EU sits at a critical tipping point, it is imperative
that the Union does not shy away from its previous commitments to further enlargement,
particularly regarding the Western Balkan states. For years, the leadership of the European
Union has reaffirmed its commitment to the Balkan region, but it has failed to follow through on
these promises with anything other than financial support and political strategies. In the 2017
State of the Union, European Commission President Jean-Claude Junker stated:
“If we want more stability in our neighborhood, then we must maintain a credible
enlargement prospective for the Western Balkans. It is clear that there will be no further
enlargement during the mandate of this Commission and this Parliament. No candidate is ready.
But thereafter the European Union will be greater than 27 in number Accession candidates must
give the rule of law, justice, and fundamental rights utmost priority in the negotiations.”101
101

European Commission. 2018. "Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions: A Credible Enlargement Perspective for And Enhanced EU Engagement with The
38

Clearly, European perspective of the Western Balkans is full of hope and promise, but up
until recently the intent has been lacking. While it is up to the regional leaders to implement
political and economic reforms within their respective countries to meet the criteria for EU
membership, it is also up to the EU to take every possible measure to aid these countries in the
transition. The enlargement cannot be a one-sided endeavor. Not only does the EU need to strike
a balance between regional cooperation and individual progress within the Balkans, but it also
needs to strengthen its commitment to the region by setting out reasonable target dates for
accession and facilitating a working partnership with the Western Balkans. There is a lot of work
to be done on both sides, but if the EU truly wishes to begin reforming the institutional and
political framework of the Union, it can heed its own advice and “assume responsibility for
making this historical opportunity a reality”.102
The Western Balkans are a part of Europe. They share a common heritage and history
with the people of Europe, and their future is defined by shared opportunities and challenges.
However, the prospect of EU membership for the Western Balkans is so much more than
geographical proximity and cultural necessity. Enlargement is a geostrategic investment, and the
Western Balkans fulfill very distinct political, security, and economic interests. The EU has an
opportunity to make up for their failed intervention in the 1990s and utilize its newfound
influence to promote democracy, the rule of law, and the respect for fundamental rights. They
have an opportunity to promote stability and further unite continental Europe, and the Balkans
are excited to one day join the EU— but this sentiment may not last forever. Thus, it is
imperative that the EU not miss an opportunity to use this region as a part of a larger strategy to
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strengthen the Union. Simply put, the Western Balkan states are not ready to join the European
Union at this time, but that must not deter the European Union utilizing this enlargement
opportunity to reshape the direction of Europe and push for deeper integration policies.
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